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ABSTRACT
HUMAN CAPITAL AND STARTUP FINANCING
Mauricio da Silva Medeiros Junior and Bernardus Van Doornik1
Lucian A. Taylor
We establish the relevance of human capital to startup financing. Using administrative
databases from the Central Bank of Brazil, we obtain information on private firms, their
founders and their access to bank credit. Our empirical strategy is based on the premature
death of founders, which allows us to identify how losing founders’ human capital affects
startup financing. The results show that once a founder dies unexpectedly, there is a decrease in the amount of credit and an increase in interest rates and default rates. These
findings are mainly driven by the death of founders who are also managers in the firm,
which is consistent with the theory of founders contributing critical resources to their firms.
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Sérgio Mikio Koyama, André Minella, Michael Schwert, and seminar participants at the Wharton School
and at the Central Bank of Brazil for helpful comments. Mauricio da Silva Medeiros Junior is grateful and
acknowledges the financial support provided by the Mack Institute for Innovation Management. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Bank of
Brazil.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

CHAPTER 1 :

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2 :

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA . . . . . . . . . .

9

CHAPTER 3 :

RESEARCH DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

3.1

Sample construction and matching procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

3.2

Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3.3

Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

CHAPTER 4 :

MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

4.1

Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death and Startup financing . . . .

20

4.2

Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death and Startup financing . . . .

25

4.3

Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

CHAPTER 5 :

MECHANISMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

5.1

Premature death, firm performance and ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

5.2

Differentiating by founders’ types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

5.3

Difference between startups and mature firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

5.4

Financial constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

CHAPTER 6 :

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

iii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 :

Summary statistics - Extensive Margin Analysis Sample . . . . . .

15

TABLE 2 :

Summary statistics - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample . . . . . . .

15

TABLE 3 :

Comparing treatment and control before the shock . . . . . . . . .

16

TABLE 4 :

Intensive Margin Analysis - Human capital and startup financing .

22

TABLE 5 :

Intensive Margin Analysis - Human capital and next period startup
financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

TABLE 6 :

Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Firm Age

. . . . . . . .

31

TABLE 7 :

Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Size of Founding Team .

31

TABLE 8 :

Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Size of Founding Team .

31

TABLE 9 :

Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . .

32

TABLE 10 : Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . .

32

TABLE 11 : Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . .

33

TABLE 12 : Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects . . . . . .

33

TABLE 13 : Human capital, ownership and employment . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

TABLE 14 : Human capital, ownership and employment focusing on firms from
SCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

TABLE 15 : Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders 40
TABLE 16 : Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders
in the next period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

TABLE 17 : Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders 41
TABLE 18 : Human capital and probability of default - Differentiating Type of
Founders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

42

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 :

Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and volume of credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 2 :

Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and number of loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 3 :

27

Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness
Test with Credit Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 9 :

26

Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and new
loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 8 :

26

Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and volume of new credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 7 :

24

Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and new
bank relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 6 :

23

Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and probability of default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 5 :

21

Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and interest rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FIGURE 4 :

21

28

Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness
Test with Credit Size - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample . . . . .

29

FIGURE 10 : Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness
Test with Number of Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

FIGURE 11 : Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness
Test with Number of Loans - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample .

30

FIGURE 12 : Premature death of founders and employment . . . . . . . . . . .

34

FIGURE 13 : Premature death of founders and employment - Reduced Sample .

35

FIGURE 14 : Premature death of founders and sales revenue . . . . . . . . . . .

36

v

FIGURE 15 : Premature death of founders and anticipation of credit receivables

36

FIGURE 16 : Premature death of founders and ownership - Full Sample . . . .

37

FIGURE 17 : Premature death of founders and ownership - Reduced Sample . .

38

FIGURE 18 : Premature death of founders and new relation comparing startups
and mature firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

FIGURE 19 : Premature death of founders and exit comparing startups and mature firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

FIGURE 20 : Premature death of founders and credit comparing startups and
mature firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

45

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
This paper asks whether and how founders matter for startup financing. This question
relates to a central debate in entrepreneurial finance: which matters more, the jockey or
the horse? In other words, how important is the founding team (the jockey) relative to the
business idea and the line of business (the horse)?
Theories of the firm, such as Rajan and Zingales (2001) and Rajan (2012), have emphasized
the importance of founding teams for startups since they contribute critical resources to
their firms. However, the property right theories based on Hart and Moore (1990) consider
that firms are defined by their non-human assets. This is ultimately an empirical debate.
Nonetheless, the evidence provided by the literature is largely descriptive.
For example, Kaplan et al. (2009) analyze a sample of 50 venture capital-financed firms
aiming to understand the importance of founding teams and the initial business idea. The
firms from their sample tend to keep their initial business idea and the line of business while
they commonly change their founding teams, suggesting that losing a founder would not
have any significant implication for the startup.
Our goal is to contribute causal evidence to this debate about the importance of founding
teams. Even though the literature has provided causal evidence on this matter recently,
our understanding on how founders matter for startup financing is still quite limited. This
paper shows that losing a founder reduces startup credit by 63%. Their credit becomes
more expensive, as we observe an increase in interest rates of 6 percentage points. And
startups struggle more to pay their debt, as we find an increase of 7 percentage points in
the default probability.
These findings are mainly driven by the turnover of a founder who is also a manager. This
dual role suggests that founders indeed matter for startup financing by contributing critical
resources to their firms. By empirically establishing the importance of founders for startup
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financing, we shed new light on theories of the firm and supporting the view of Rajan and
Zingales (2001) and Rajan (2012).
In order to do so, we first obtained a set of confidential databases from Brazil provided by
the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and other institutions. These databases contain detailed
information about startups ownership, their lenders and their respective deaths, if occurred.
Thus, the data allow us to apply an approach based on premature death of founders (Jaravel
et al., 2018; Becker and Hvide, 2019; Choi et al., 2019) to identify a causal effect of the
founder turnover on startup financing through bank lending.
We use the premature death of founders as a quasi-natural experiment to measure loss
in the firm’s human capital. This approach also mitigates the endogeneity concerns that
might exist in our framework. One could argue that a founder turnover might be explained
by a previous reduction in credit, for instance. Using the premature death of founders
as an instrument, we can focus on a causal channel between the founder loss and startup
financing.
To perform this analysis, we build a treated and a control group to be able to compare
each treated firm with a placebo firm and to quantify the impact of an unexpected loss of
a founder. Since we focus on young and early-stage firms, our treated group is built based
on firms that experienced the premature death of a founder in their first five years. This
approach is similar to the one applied by Choi et al. (2019). It also follows the definition
of a startup applied in the entrepreneurial finance literature, which is a firm of at most five
years of operation (Howell and Brown, 2019).
In our approach, a founder’s premature death is one which the age of the deceased founder is
between 18 and 60 years, since the death probability of people in this interval is significantly
lower than people over 60 years (Jaravel et al., 2018; Cortes et al., 2019; Choi et al., 2019).
In the context of Brazil, this definition of unexpected death is also reasonable given that
the life expectancy there was higher than 70 years during our sample period, which is from
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2003 to 2019.1
Since our shock introduces a bias due to the fact that we are analyzing its occurrence when
the firms are young, we perform a matching procedure that allows us to find a suitable
control group for each of our treated firms. We perform the matching procedure using
information on year the firm was opened, age of founders, size of founding team, legal form,
industry and if the firm hired employees.
Through this process we build the treated and the control groups. Our empirical analysis
relies on the estimation of Difference-In-Differences models using our matched sample to
examine how our treated firms are affected by the unexpected death of a founder relative
to the control group. Our shock happens in different years depending on the firm under
analysis, thus we follow Gormley and Matsa (2011) to estimate our models properly.
We aim to quantify the impact of the loss of a founder on startup financing and to understand how it affects these firms. Our empirical strategy is based on the instrument of
premature deaths, which allows us to mitigate the endogeneity issues that we have in our
setting. Since our results suggest that the parallel trends are satisfied in our main models,
we can make causal inferences of these findings.
By performing an intensive margin analysis, we find evidence showing that once the premature death of a founding team member occurs there is a decrease of 63% in the volume
of credit and of 21% in the number of loans, implying that there is a reduction in startup
financing when the premature death of a founder occurs. Besides this analysis related to
quantity, we also analyze the pricing of debt. Specifically, we estimate the effect of the
shock on interest rates. It suggests an increase of 6 percentage points one year after the
shock occurred. This impact vanishes after three years of its occurrence.
Another important variable that we analyze is the probability of default. Once the shock
occurs, there is an increase of 7 percentage points in the probability of default in the short
1

Source: The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=BR, accessed on October 25, 2020.
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term and this effect tends to vanish two years after the shock. This result on default is
consistent with the decrease in credit and the increase in prices when the shock occurs.
We also perform an extensive margin analysis. Our evidence suggests that the premature
death of a founder reduces the access to new credit significantly. The shock is associated
with a decrease higher than 5 percentage points in the firm probability to establish a relation
with a new bank. Our findings indicate that the shock is also associated with a reduction of
5% on volume of new credit one year after the premature death, and the founder’s premature
death is associated with a decrease of 0.5 percentage point in the probability of obtaining
a new loan.
This evidence establishes a significant decrease in startup financing after the occurrence
of the premature death of a founder. To understand the possible mechanisms that might
explain these findings, we use the information on the type of founders. We can identify if
a deceased founder is also a manager of the firm or an angel investor (a founder who only
has shares but do not work for the firm).
Our findings suggest that the death of a founder of either type has negative effect on
startup financing. Nonetheless, the death of an angel investor has a weaker impact on the
firm compared to the death of a founder who is also a manager. For instance, the decrease
of an angel investor death in the number of loans is 18.8% of the effect of a manager founder
death. This implies that founders who are involved with their firms as managers contribute
critical resources to them.
These results are consistent with the discussion presented by the theory of firms literature
that emphasizes the importance of certain crucial human assets for early-stage firms and
their growth (Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Rajan, 2012). To improve our understanding of
these critical resources that founders might bring to their firms, we also study what is the
effect of the premature death on measures related to firm performance aiming to analyze if
our instrumental variable also represents a productivity shock for startups.
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We observe a 27.5% reduction in firm size (measured by the number of employees), which is
persistent throughout our sample period. Our evidence also shows a 50% reduction in sales
(measured by credit card sales) one year after the shock occurred, but this effect occurs
only in the short term (one year after the shock). These results suggest that the premature
death of a founder is a meaningful negative shock for startups.
Aiming to understand how founders matter for the entry decision of new investors in their
firms, we perform an analysis that estimates the effect of our shock on the entry probability
of a new owner in the startup. In some of our models, we identify a reduction in the entry
probability of a new investor (these results are either negative or not statistically significant)
associated with the occurrence of the shock. This is additional evidence that suggests how
founders are crucial for firms, since the entry decision of new investors tends to be negatively
associated with the death of a founder.
Once we differentiate the effect of the founder’s death on firm size defined by the number
of employees and the entry probability of a new owner, we verify an even clearer distinction
on how different types of founders can contribute to their firms. We observe that both
types of investors (angel investor and manager investor) have a negative effect on firm size.
However, the death of an angel investor decreases employment less than the death of a
founder who is also a manager. We also find that the death of an angel investor increases
the entry probability of a new owner while the death of a founder who is also a manager
decreases that probability.
Thus, the deaths of these two different types of founders imply shocks that have different
natures for the startups. Our evidence suggests the death of a founder who is also a manager
is a negative productivity shock due to the loss of a critical resource to the firm, since it
reduces financing through bank lending and the entry probability of a new owner. Whereas
the death of an angel investor is also a negative shock for the firm but through a different
channel. Once the premature death of an angel investor occurs, we observe an increase in
the entry probability of a new owner in the firm. This suggests that the premature death
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of an angel investor might be mainly a financial negative shock to the firm.
These findings contribute to the extensive literature on the theory of the firm. As discussed
in Kaplan et al. (2009) and Bernstein et al. (2017), this literature has different perspectives on how assets and their different types matter for how an organization is built and
structured. The property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990;
Holmstrom, 1999) assigns to non-human assets the role of being the most important asset
within an organization, while there is a different perspective that attributes this role to
human assets (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2001; Rajan, 2012).
Our paper contributes to this theoretical debate by providing causal evidence on the importance of the founders to startup financing. We also analyze how different types of founders
matter for startup financing, providing a better understanding about the importance of
different human assets for the startup. Our setting does not allow us to compare human
assets with non-human assets to identify which one is more important. Nonetheless, we do
observe that founders are extremely relevant to their firms.
This paper also adds to the entrepreneurial finance literature and, specifically, the debate
on the importance of the business idea relative to the founding team. Kaplan et al. (2009)
is one of the first studies to empirically analyze this matter. They conclude that investors
should place more weight on the business rather than on the management team, since the
business idea is more stable than founding teams. However, the analysis of Kaplan et al.
(2009) is mainly descriptive. Our contribution is to provide causal evidence on the relevance
of founders to startup financing, especially those founders who are also managers and are
more involved in the operation of their firms.
The studies closest to ours are Becker and Hvide (2019) and Choi et al. (2019), since they
address questions related to the relevance of founding teams for startup performance and
provide causal evidence of that relation. Our setting also allows us to analyze a few measures
of startup performance, but our main contribution is related to how startup financing is
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affected by founding teams. We also explore the heterogeneity that we have across different
types of founders to understand how that affects access to credit of these young and earlystage firms.
Within the entrepreneurial finance literature, there is also a discussion on how young and
early stage firms are financed. Howell (2017) examines the effectiveness of R&D subsidies
and how it helps startups to mitigate their financial constraints. We add to this literature
by focusing on the access that these younger firms have to the credit markets and how their
human capital affects their financing through bank lending.
Our paper also adds to the literature that studies early-stage investments. This literature
has strong causal evidence establishing the importance of early-stage investments on firm
success (Sørensen, 2007; Kerr et al., 2011; Bernstein et al., 2016). That is why recently it
has focused on how early-stage investors choose the firms that they are financing (Bernstein
et al., 2017; Gompers et al., 2020). Bernstein et al. (2017) provide causal evidence on
the relevance of startups characteristics to investors, focusing more specifically on angel
investors. Gompers et al. (2020) use surveys to study trends on the Venture Capital industry,
the importance of angel investment for startups and what matters to these investors.
Even though this literature focuses on the behavior of investors, we contribute to this
debate by causally analyzing the importance of human capital for banks when they consider
financing to startups. Bank lending is another relevant source of financing for younger and
earlier-stage firms that seems to be significantly affected by the human capital that these
firms have at their disposal. We provide causal evidence on how much founders matter for
startups financing through bank lending.
There is another literature related to our study based on the use of premature death to build
quasi-natural experiments to identify the importance of human capital in different contexts
(Jones and Olken, 2005; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Azoulay et al., 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen,
2010). This instrument is also applied to understand the importance of human capital for
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innovation outcomes (Jaravel et al., 2018; Cortes et al., 2019) and entrepreneurship (Becker
and Hvide, 2019; Choi et al., 2019). We leverage their methodological developments to
estimate the causal effect of a founder’s premature death on startup financing obtained
through bank lending.
This paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we present the data and the institutional
background. Section 3 describes the research design and the identification strategy we apply
to address our question of interest. In Section 4 we focus on our empirical findings and on
the discussion related to its interpretation. In Section 5 we discuss possible mechanisms
that can explain our results related to human capital and startup financing. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
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CHAPTER 2 : INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA
To address our research question and to test how important human capital is to startup
financing, we use Brazil as a laboratory and the premature deaths of founders of firms in the
country as a quasi-natural experiment to study how founders matter for startup financing.
This empirical strategy allows us to mitigate the possible endogeneity issues we might have
in our setting.
We have access to administrative databases that have detailed information about all private
firms in Brazil, providing access to relevant information related to their founders, ownership,
investors, lenders, credit, proxies for sales and information on employment. These databases
also provide information on the age of founders and the occurrence of their death, which is
crucial to our identification strategy.

1

The BCB provides access to a database from the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service (Receita
Federal - RF) that has information on birth and death dates. This database allows us to
identify the year of birth of every Brazilian citizen that has the Brazilian social security
number (which is called Cadastro de Pessoa Fı́sica - CPF)2 and the date of the deaths that
were registered until the first quarter of 2020.
We have access to another database provided by the BCB which is organized by the RF
called Membership Board (Quadro Societário). The main purpose of this database in our
setting is to identify the founders of each firm, their current owners and when the firms in
our sample were established. It also allows us to observe the current status of each firm in
Brazil to determine whether they are still operating or not.
This database is filled out annually by all tax-registered firms. If a firm does not provide
1

All the databases used in this paper are confidential databases held by the BCB. The collection and
manipulation of identified individual level data were conducted exclusively by the staff of the BCB. External
researchers had access only to unidentified or aggregated data.
2
To be allowed to open a firm legally in Brazil, a founder must have a CPF. This allows us to merge the
information on birth and death using this identifier at the person level with the databases on ownership to
which we have access.
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the required information to the Brazilian Internal Revenue Service, it can be subjected to
severe penalties including the suspension of their activity. It is important to observe that
we only have access to the most updated information provided by the firms in this database.
In our sample, this was updated for the last time in March 2020.
Information on bank lending for each firm comes from the Brazilian Credit Registry (Sistema
de Informações de Crédito do Banco Central do Brasil - SCR), a large and comprehensive
data set maintained by the BCB for monitoring purposes. This data is confidential and
protected by laws in Brazil related to bank secrecy. It has information about all loans with
outstanding value above a minimum threshold of BRL 5,000 (approximately USD 1,000
in 2020) until 2011 and BRL 1,000 (approximately USD 200 in 2020) until 2017, and all
banks are obligated to report this information to the BCB (Cortes et al., 2019; Fonseca and
Van Doornik, 2019).
The SCR has detailed information at the loan level (i.e., all loans obtained by a firm with
its banks). Since our focus is on the firm lending, we aggregate loan-level data at the firm
level. We also perform analysis with the data on bank-firm level to understand how the
heterogeneity in the lenders dimension matters to understand the importance of human
capital to firm financing. This database contains detailed information on lending amount,
interest rates, maturities, and credit rating.
We consider all commercial banks operating in Brazil between 2003 and 2016. We exclude
investment banks, credit unions, and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) as they
are fundamentally different from commercial banks. We also drop inter-bank loans and
focus exclusively on loans directed to non-financial firms following the practice applied by
(Cortes et al., 2019).
The BCB has another database that provides information on receivables. It allows us to
observe payments received by firms in Brazil that were made by credit and debit card. We
also have access to information on anticipation of credit that these firms could obtain due
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to former payments they received. This database started to be organized in January 2017
and goes until 2019 at a monthly frequency.
Finally, we also use a database called Annual Relation of Social Information (Relação Anual
de Informações Sociais - RAIS), which is a matched employer-employee administrative data
from the Brazilian Ministry of Economy. RAIS is a mandatory survey filled out annually by
all tax-registered firms in Brazil. Incomplete or late information results in severe penalties,
which leads to a high degree of compliance and essentially complete coverage of all employees
in the Brazilian formal sector as observed by Fonseca and Van Doornik (2019).
This database has information at firm and worker level from 1976 to the present. It allows
us to track individuals over time and across firms since 2002. Through this database, we
obtain information about the tax identifiers of firms and their establishments, their locations
and industry. We also get information on individual payroll, hours they worked, hiring and
firing dates, reason for firing, type of contracts (such as temporary contract, apprenticeship
contract, etc), occupational category and some demographic information including gender,
nationality, age, and education.
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CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH DESIGN
Our goal is to understand the importance of human capital to startup financing. That
is why we exploit a quasi-natural experiment based on the premature death of founders
to quantify the effect of the human capital loss related to the founder’s death on startup
financing. Due to the nature of the databases available to us, we focus on startup financing
through bank lending. Our main hypothesis is the following one:

Hypothesis: Human capital brought by founders matters for startup financing through
bank lending.

We follow the methodologies of Jaravel et al. (2018); Choi et al. (2019) to build our shock
based on the premature death of founders and to construct our treated and control groups.
Then, we follow Gormley and Matsa (2011) to estimate the impact of our shock on measures related to startup financing. We extend our analysis to understand the importance of
founders to the entry of new investors as well, but our focus is on startup financing through
bank lending. The following sections describe the methodologies we apply and our empirical
analysis.

3.1. Sample construction and matching procedure
Initially we focus on the database provided by the RF with all the individuals that own
a firm or at least have shares in a firm in Brazil. We merge this database with the other
database provided by the RF that has information on the year these entrepreneurs were born
and the year they passed away together with some information about their firms (i.e., its
status and when it was established). Since our goal is to identify a causal relation between
the premature death of a founder and firm financing, we focus on premature deaths defined
by founders who passed away between the ages of 18 and 60 years. We follow the approach
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of Jaravel et al. (2018) and Choi et al. (2019) to address some of the endogeneity problems
in our setting.
Our goal is to understand how human capital matters for startup financing. Following the
recent literature on entrepreneurship (see Howell and Brown (2019)), we define a startup
as a firm that is at most five years old. Given this definition, we focus our analysis on
premature deaths that occurred in the first five 5 years of the startups in our sample
following Jaravel et al. (2018) and Choi et al. (2019). While Jaravel et al. (2018) focus on
the effect of premature death at the individual level, Choi et al. (2019) apply that to the
firm level, which is the framework we rely on.
Considering our complete sample obtained from the database provided by RF, we have
11,572,606 firms, of which 62,481 suffered a premature death of one of their founders in
their first five years of operation. Of these 62,481 firms, there are 5,298 firms that suffered
the shock and have information on RAIS, while 9,787 of them have information on SCR.
The firms that experience a premature death as we defined it tend to have a small number
of employees and by construction are younger. Therefore, our empirical strategy creates a
selection bias that can jeopardize our conclusions.
To mitigate this issue, we follow the approach of Choi et al. (2019) and perform a coarsened
exact matching procedure to obtain a control group of firms that are going to be our
placebo. The characteristics that we focus on are industry code (the five-digit industry code
called National Classification of Economic Activity, Classificação Nacional de Atividades
Econômicas - CNAE, from 1995), legal form, age of firm, age of founders, size of founding
team and the firms should also have registered employees at least once (i.e., these firms
belong to RAIS at least one time). By using this procedure, we build a control group that
did not experience a premature death of one of their founders and we are able to compare
this group to our treated group, defined as firms in which a founder dies prematurely in the
first five years of operation.
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By following this procedure, we have a sample of 8,728 firms, where 4,364 firms are treated
and 4,364 firms are control. We have a small sample of firms because only 5,298 firms from
RAIS suffered the shock as we defined it. Our firms are mainly small firms with a small
founding team, since the average number of people on their founding team is 3.14 and the
standard deviation is 2.
Our empirical analysis on startup financing focuses on two subsamples. We consider a
sample that goes from 2003 to 2016 that has 58,648 firm-year observation to perform an
extensive margin analysis with credit information. This paper also studies credit in an
intensive margin analysis focusing on a sample that goes from 2003 to 2016 and has 14,218
firm-year observations, which are those with positive outstanding credit.

3.2. Descriptive statistics
In this section we provide the descriptive statistics of all variables that we built considering
the samples used for the extensive margin analysis (i.e., full sample) and the intensive
margin analysis (i.e., reduced sample). These descriptive statistics are presented in Tables
1 and 2. We also compute the summary statistics at the year before the shock differentiated
by control and treated group to understand if there is any significant difference between
them prior to the shock.
As it is presented in Table 3, we compute the differences between our main variables of
interest for the full sample (variables used in our Extensive Margin Analysis) and a sample
that focus only on the firm-year observations that have outstanding credit on the SCR
database (variables used in our Intensive Margin Analysis).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable
ln(Credit)
ln(N umber Loans)
P robability of Def ault
Interest Rate
P robability of N ew Relation
ln(V olume of N ew Credit)
P robability of N ew Loan
ln(Employment)
Entry N ew Owner
F irm Age
Size of F ounding T eam

- Extensive Margin Analysis
Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
58,648 3.17
4.86
58,648 0.726
1.08
58,648 0.023
0.148
58,648 0.085
0.216
58,648 0.389
0.488
58,648 0.083
0.903
58,648 0.009
0.092
58,648 1.12
1.5
58,648 0.139
0.346
58,648 4.04
3.62
58,648 3.14
2.00

Sample
Min Max
0
18.41
0
7.38
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
14.36
0
1
0
9.43
0
1
0
24
1
42

Table 2: Summary statistics - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample
Variable
Obs
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Credit)
14,218 10.50
1.793
0.01 18.41
ln(N umber Loans)
14,218 2.03
0.976
0.69 7.37
P robability of Def ault
14,218 0.063
0.243
0
1
Interest Rate
14,218 .349
.317
0
1
ln(Employment)
14,218 1.90
1.71
0
8.47
Entry N ew Owner
14,218 0.073
0.26
0
1
F irm Age
14,218 4.43
3.69
0
24
Size of F ounding T eam 14,218 3.03
1.79
1
22

This table presents the summary statistics of our main variables. ln(Credit) is the log of credit volume (i.e.,
credit size) plus 1, ln(N umber of Loans) is the log of number of loans plus 1, P robability of Def ault is
a dummy variable if the firm defaults and 0 otherwise, Interest Rate is the average interest rate weighted
by the size of the loans, P robabilityof N ewRelation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm creates a
relation with a new bank and 0 otherwise, ln(V olume of N ew Credit) the log of new credit volume plus 1,
P robability of N ewLoan is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a new loan is issued to the firm and 0 otherwise,
ln(Employment) is the log of firm size given by number of employees plus 1, Entry N ew Owner is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a new investor buys shares and 0 otherwise, F irm Age is the age of the firm
in years and Size of F ounding T eam is the number of the founding team members.
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Table 3: Comparing treatment and control before the shock
Treatment Control p-value of difference
(1)
(2)
(3)
Intensive Margin Analysis
ln(Credit)
ln(N umber Loans)
Interest Rate
P robability of Def ault
ln(Employment)
Entry N ew Owner

2.40
(0.202)
0.465
(0.042)
0.097
(0.010)
0.014
(0.005)
0.39
(0.048)
0.136
(0.015)

2.89
(0.225)
0.543
(0.047)
0.091
(0.010)
0.006
(0.003)
0.40
(0.053)
0.131
(0.015)

0.10

0.084
(0.004)
0.020
(0.006)
0.002
(0.0007)

0.092
(0.004)
0.018
(0.006)
0.001
(0.0006)

0.20

3.31
(0.030)
0.352
(0.012)

2.97
(0.030)
0.387
(0.014)

0.00∗∗∗

0.22
0.65
0.21
0.85
0.79

Extensive Margin Analysis
P robability of N ew Relation
ln(V olume of N ew Credit)
P robability of N ew Loan

Size of F ounding T eam
F irm Age

0.78
0.63

0.07∗

This table presents the mean, the standard errors (in parentheses) and the p-value of the differences between
treated and control groups for all variables of interest computed in the year prior to the shock. Treated firms
are those that one of their founders died between 18 and 60 years old in the first five years of their existence.
For the variables applied in the Intensive Margin Analysis, we consider the reduced sample that focus on the
firm-year observations that have outstanding credit defined by the database SCR. For the variables applied
in the Extensive Margin Analysis, Size of F ounding T eam and F irm Age, we consider the full matched
sample.

∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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3.3. Empirical approach
To address our research question, we focus our analysis on the matched sample built based
on the strategy of Jaravel et al. (2018) and Choi et al. (2019) described previously. Initially
we estimate a Dynamic Difference-In-Differences following the approach of Gormley and
Matsa (2011) to test for the parallel trends hypotheses in our setting. Using this empirical
strategy, we estimate the effect of human capital on startup financing and other dependent
variables that are relevant for startups, which is given by Equation 3.1:

Yf,t =

5
X

βk × Postf ,t+k × Treatedf

(3.1)

k=−4

+F irm F Ef + Y ear F Et + F irm Age F Ef,t + εf,t

where Yf,t is volume of credit, number of loans, average interest rate, probability of default,
probability of new relation with a bank, volume of new credit and probability of a new
loan. We also perform analyses to estimate the effect on entry of new owner, employment
and sales. The variable T reatedf is equal to 1 if the firm is a treated firm and 0 otherwise.
P ostf,t is equal to 1 when the shock occurs and 0 otherwise varying by firm f and year t.
We also include year, firm and firm age fixed effects to control for common trends.
This empirical approach is quite similar to Choi et al. (2019) as well. The only difference
is that we do not include the variable P ostf,t in our estimation, but we perform robustness
tests to guarantee that our results are valid by estimating the model for each year that a
shock occurs from 2005 to 2014.
Following the analysis of the aforementioned model, we also estimate a Staggered DifferenceIn-Differences described by Equation 3.2 following an empirical strategy similar to the one
applied by Gormley and Matsa (2011). Once parallel trends are satisfied, we analyze the
results provided by Equation 3.2 to establish the importance of human capital for startup
17

financing.

Yf,t = β × Postf ,t × Treatedf

(3.2)

+F irm F Ef + Y ear F Et + F irm Age F Ef,t + εf,t

Our main goal is to estimate the parameter β to understand the effect of the premature
deaths of founders on startup financing. We also perform an analysis using our shock to
verify how startup performance is affected in our sample to provide a better understanding
of what is happening with credit as well. Even though we cannot disentangle the impact
of premature death on the supply of credit from the effect on the demand of credit, we are
able to provide evidence on how this shock affects variables that are relevant for the supply
and demand for credit.
Using information on the type of each founder, we can identify angel investors (i.e., owners
that are not managers in the firm) and founders who are also managers. We use this
information to extend the analysis discussed so far and to understand how the impact of
the premature death of founders is affected by the founders’ type. Theory would argue that
founders who are also managers on startups bring a specific human capital to their firms
that helps them to grow, while angel investors help the firm to deal mainly with its financial
constraints. We can verify empirically the validity of this argument by comparing the effect
of the premature deaths of manager founders to the premature deaths of angel investors.
To test the robustness of our main results, we estimate the effect of the shock separating
our sample by every year that a shock occurred. We have premature deaths happening
from 2005 to 2014, and through our matched sample we have for each treated firm a control
firm. We split our samples in cohorts based on the years in which we observe a premature
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death in our sample, and we estimate the effect of the shock on startup financing using
a Difference-In-Differences framework. This methodology is basically the application of
multiple Difference-In-Differences approaches applied for all the years that a shock occurs.
Ideally Equations 3.1 and 3.2 would capture the average effect of the shocks in every year
that has a premature death of a founder. By splitting our sample into these different cohorts
based on the years in which a startup experienced the premature death of their founder,
we can verify the years that are driving our results obtained through Equations 3.1 and
3.2 to guarantee that our set of fixed effects are capturing all the trends at the cohort level
(Gormley and Matsa, 2011).
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CHAPTER 4 : MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1. Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death and Startup financing
The impact of the shock on credit
Our first set of results focuses on the effect of the premature death of founders on startup
financing in the intensive margin. Initially we consider the volume of credit (i.e., credit
size) and number of loans to analyze how these variables are affected by a change in human
capital based on the premature death of a founder in the earlier stages of the firm. We
perform an intensive margin analysis focusing on firm-year observations presented in the
SCR with positive outstanding credit. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level
throughout this analysis.
By estimating Equation 3.1 with credit size and number of loans as dependent variables, we
observe that the parallel trends are satisfied. It suggests that there is no anticipation effect
of the premature death within the startup. This mitigates the possibility of endogeneity
issues in our framework, allowing us to causally identify a reduction in startup financing
measured by credit size and number of loans. We perform this analysis with a subsample of
firms that belong to our database on lending and have outstanding credit. It allows us to
observe the effect of the shock within the group of young firms that get credit from Brazilian
banks. Figures 1 and 2 present these results.
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Figure 1: Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and volume of credit

Figure 2: Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and number of loans
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We also estimate Equation 3.2 to quantify the effect of our shock on startup financing using
both credit size and number of loans as dependent variables. Our evidence shows that
there is a 63% decrease in the volume of credit and of 21% decrease in the number of loans
when the premature death of a founding team member occurs as described in Table 4. This
implies that there is a reduction in startup financing once the premature death occurs.
These results are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also observe a reduction on
startup financing when the variables credit size and number of loans are computed for the
next period (see Table 5).
Table 4: Intensive Margin Analysis - Human capital and startup financing
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.635∗∗∗
-0.215∗∗
(0.062)
(0.033)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 5: Intensive Margin Analysis - Human capital and next period startup financing
ln(Creditf,t+1 ) ln(N umber Loansf,t+1 )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-1.64∗∗∗
-0.160∗∗
(0.318)
(0.062)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Our shock allows us to causally identify how significant the reduction is on startup financing
once there is the premature death of a founder. These findings establish the relevance that
founders have for startup financing through bank lending. Even though we do not have
access to detailed information about other sources of financing, such as venture capital in22

vestment, our results shed light on the importance of founders for external investors as well,
which is in line with the discussion in Gompers et al. (2020).

The impact of the shock on interest rate
Besides the effects on quantity, we also examine how the premature death of a founder
affects prices. Our goal is to understand how cost of debt is affected by the death of a
founder. That is why we build interest rates weighted by the size of the loans that each
firm has in a given year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout
this analysis.
Figure 3: Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and interest rates

Figure 3 reports the coefficients of the Difference-In-Differences model that we estimate to
capture the effect of the shock on interest rate. Since there is evidence that the parallel
trends are satisfied, we use these results to conduct a causal analysis of the premature death
of founders on interest rate.
We observe that the shock increases interest rate by 6 percentage points, suggesting that
startup financing through bank credit becomes more expensive for the treated firms. This
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increase is identified until three years after the shock, then the impact vanishes and remains
not statistically significant after that. These findings are also consistent with the short-term
decrease in credit and number of loans that we verified previously.

The impact of the shock on default
To understand how startup financing is affected, we also analyze how default is affected due
to the occurrence of the founder’s premature death. In this case, our main dependent is
the probability that a firm defaults a certain loan captured by a dummy variable equal to
1 if default occurs and 0 otherwise. Figure 4 provides the estimates of the model using the
sample based on the firm-year observations presented in the SCR with positive outstanding
credit. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
Figure 4: Intensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and probability of default

By analyzing Figure 4, we compare the treated and control firms that have outstanding
credit with at least one bank. Even though the parallel trends are not satisfied (the effect
four years prior to the occurrence of the shock is statistically significant), we observe a shortterm increase in the probability of default associated with the occurrence of the shock. This
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implies that there is a positive association between the shock and the probability of default.
The rise in default happens when the shock occurs, and the impact of the shock vanishes
becoming not statistically significant three years after the shock.
This evidence indicates that the premature death of a founder is positively associated with
the default probability. Through Figure 4 we establish a causal effect of the shock on default suggesting that treated firms tend to default more than the control ones. These results
are also consistent with the reduction in credit and the increase in interest rate discussed
previously. All these findings suggest that young and early-stage firms are under struggle
when one of their founders dies.

4.2. Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death and Startup financing
We also perform an extensive margin analysis to estimate the effect of premature death on
the creation of a connection with new banks, the size of new credit issued and the issuance
of new loans. These results allow us to understand how the prospective of the startups
in relation to financing is affected after the shock. Throughout this analysis, we cluster
standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level.
Our first set of results described by Figure 5 shows an association between the shock and
a decrease in the firm’s probability of establishing a new relation with another bank. This
association between the shock and new bank relationship seems to remain for five years
after the premature death of a founder.
We also observe in Figures 6 and 7 that the human capital loss measured by the premature
death of the founder is associated with a reduction in the amount of new credit, and with a
reduction in the probability of obtaining new credit. Both variables are correlated with the
shock one year after the premature death and these results remain statistically significant
at the 5% level until the end of the second year after the shock.
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Figure 5: Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and new bank relationship

Figure 6: Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and volume of new
credit
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Figure 7: Extensive Margin Analysis - Premature death of founders and new loan

Both the extensive and the intensive margin analyses corroborate that credit becomes
scarcer for startups once the shock occurs. Our evidence suggests that after the premature
death of a founder, treated firms have more difficulty than the control firms to establish
new credit lines with banks.

4.3. Robustness Tests
Estimating the model for each year that a shock occurs
To verify the robustness of our results, we estimate our models by each year of occurrence
of the shock. The matching procedure allows us to find a control firm for each treated firm,
thus we can build different cohorts based on the years that we observe a premature death
of a founder. Once we do that, we can estimate our Difference-In-Differences models (both
the dynamic version and the standard version) for each year that there is a shock in our
sample. By estimating our models based on the cohorts given by each year that a shock
occurs, we can verify which years explain most of our main findings. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
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We run these models for both volume of credit and number of loans as described in Figures
8, 9, 10 and 11. Our results from Figures 8 and 10 suggest that only the shocks that
occurred in 2005 and 2006 do not have a statistically significant and negative effect on our
measures of credit. In most of the years the premature death of a founder has a statistically
significant and negative effect, suggesting that our main findings are not driven by just a
few years in our sample. They seem to be robust in relation to the year that the shocks
occurred.
While Figures 8 and 10 focus on our full matched sample, in Figures 9 and 11 we estimate
the models focusing on the sample used in our intensive margin analysis based on firmyear observations with positive outstanding credit. Once we focus on this reduced sample,
we lose power in our tests since we have a smaller amount of observations in each year.
Nonetheless, we still observe the negative effect on both credit size and number of loans
once the shock occurs for most of the years that a founder dies in our sample.
Figure 8: Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness Test with Credit
Size

The effect on time -1 before the shock is omitted in this figure because it is the one we normalize to 0.
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Figure 9: Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness Test with Credit
Size - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample

Figure 10: Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness Test with
Number of Loans

The effect on time -1 before the shock is omitted in both figures because it is the one we normalize to 0.
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Figure 11: Premature death of founders and startup financing - Robustness Test with
Number of Loans - Intensive Margin Analysis Sample

The effect on time -1 before the shock is omitted in this figure because it is the one we normalize to 0.

Controlling the model for ex-ante characteristics
Table 3 shows that firm age and size of founding team the year prior to the shock are
different when we compare treated and control groups and these differences are statistically
significant. Therefore, we estimate our main models controlling for these variables at their
level prior to the shock including their values and their interactions as described in Tables
6 and 7. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
Our main results remain similar to those that we presented previously once we include
firm age and size of founding team in the year prior to the shock in our regressions. The
main difference is in relation to the findings of the models using number of loans as a
dependent variable once we control for size of founding team in the year prior to the shock.
Even though in the results of Table 7 we lose statistical significance once we estimate the
effect on variables measured at the current level, we still have negative and statistically
significant results on our measures related to startup financing measured in the next period
as presented in Table 8.
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Table 6: Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Firm Age
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.658
-0.209∗∗∗
(0.069)
(0.036)
P ostf,t × T reatedf × F irmAgef
0.053
-0.013
(0.077)
(0.037)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 7: Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Size of Founding Team
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.863
-0.108
(0.143)
(0.068)
P ostf,t × T reatedf × SF Tf
0.069∗
-0.032∗
(0.037)
(0.019)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
SF Tf is the size of founding team of firm f at the year prior to the shock
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 8: Robustness Test - Controlling for Ex-ante Size of Founding Team
ln(Creditf,t+1 ) ln(N umber Loansf,t+1 )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-1.909∗∗∗
-0.185∗
(0.583)
(0.092)
P ostf,t × T reatedf × SF Tf
0.079
-0.001
(0.125)
(0.012)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
SF Tf is the size of founding team of firm f at the year prior to the shock
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Controlling the model for industry fixed effects
We also estimate our main models controlling for industry fixed effects. Through this
procedure, we aim to control our models for the fact that different industries might be
differently exposed to our shock. Tables 9 and 10 show the results controlling for industry
fixed effects. In this case we use the five-digit industry codes provided by RAIS called CNAE
from 1995. We perform the same analysis focusing on the first two digits of this code to
be able to estimate the model including industry fixed effects in a broader way. These
results are provided in Tables 11 and 12. The results remain the same in both approaches.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
Table 9: Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.693
-0.213∗∗∗
(0.066)
(0.031)
N
12,213
12,213
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year × Industry FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 10: Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects
ln(Creditf,t+1 ) ln(N umber Loansf,t+1 )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-1.78∗∗∗
-0.209∗∗
(0.34)
(0.077)
N
12,213
12,213
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year × Industry FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 11: Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.629∗∗∗
-0.211∗∗∗
(0.061)
(0.032)
N
13,098
13,098
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year × Industry FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 12: Robustness Test - Controlling for Industry Fixed Effects
ln(Creditf,t+1 ) ln(N umber Loansf,t+1 )
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-1.71
-0.202∗∗
(0.325)
(0.072)
N
13,098
13,098
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year × Industry FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 5 : MECHANISMS
5.1. Premature death, firm performance and ownership
Now we focus on how the premature death affects measures related to firm performance.
Through this strategy, we aim to understand if startups’ performance may be affected by the
premature death of a founder. We also aim to analyze if this effect could mean a negative
productivity shock due to the fact that founders might contribute critical resources to their
firms that go beyond financing.
We follow the approach applied to analyze startup financing and estimate a Dynamic
Difference-In-Differences to understand how human capital matters for startup employment, sales and the anticipation of credit. Our findings show a statistically significant
reduction in employment when the shock occurs. We also observe that parallel trends are
satisfied, allowing us to make a causal analysis. These findings are shown in Figures 12 and
13. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
Figure 12: Premature death of founders and employment
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Figure 13: Premature death of founders and employment - Reduced Sample

We estimate the effect of premature death on sales (measured by credit card sales) and
credit anticipated by firms estimate. Since our data for receivables is from 2017 to 2019, we
perform a matching using the same characteristics used before to build our matched sample
and we also focus on firms for which we have information on receivables to analyze how the
premature death of a founder affects sales and credit anticipation. Our focus here is just
to study how this shock affects these other variables correlated to firm performance so we
can understand how our shock matters for productivity. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level throughout this analysis.
Our findings show a reduction in startup sales once the premature death of a founder
occurs.1 These results related to sales and the ones related to employment indicate that
startups struggle when they experience an unexpected death of one of their founders, which
is similar to the findings of Choi et al. (2019). These findings are shown in Figures 14 and
15.

1

We obtain a similar result using debit card sales, which is available upon request.
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Figure 14: Premature death of founders and sales revenue

Figure 15: Premature death of founders and anticipation of credit receivables
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Even though we observe that employment and credit are negatively affected by the premature death, we also analyze if there is the entrance of a new owner in the firm once the
shock occurs. Our goal in this analysis is to understand if the expectations of the external
investors are also affected by the premature death of founders. Standard errors are again
clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
We observe that there is a negative association between the shock and the entry probability
of a new owner according to Figure 16. Our findings show that there is a reduction of 2
percentage points in the entry probability of a new owner once a founder dies prematurely.
There are other settings where there is no effect as suggested by Figure 17. Thus, our
evidence indicates that a founder’s death has a negative or null effect on the entry probability
of a new owner. We also analyze these results estimated in a standard staggered DifferenceIn-Differences setting (see Tables 13 and 14).
Figure 16: Premature death of founders and ownership - Full Sample

37

Figure 17: Premature death of founders and ownership - Reduced Sample

Table 13: Human capital, ownership and employment
Entry N ew Ownerf,t ln(Employmentf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.028
-0.275∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.031)
N
58,294
25,864
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 14: Human capital, ownership and employment focusing on firms from SCR
Entry N ew Ownerf,t ln(Employmentf,t )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.011
-0.190∗∗∗
(0.007)
(0.047)
N
13,110
8,667
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Given the assumption that deaths of founders between 18 and 60 years old are unexpected
(Jaravel et al., 2018; Choi et al., 2019) and the evidence suggesting that parallel trends are
satisfied in our models, we can conclude that the premature death of a founder is a negative
shock for startups. Clearly it affects both demand for and supply of credit. However, in
our setting is not possible to disentangle supply and demand to verify which effect prevails.
All we can argue in relation to this matter is that if firms are demanding credit after the
shock, they are paying higher interest to banks and are not getting it through the entry of
new owners. This suggests that founders possess critical resources that are crucial to their
firms’ financing.

5.2. Differentiating by founders’ types
We also estimate our models differentiating founders by their type to understand better
the importance of founders to startup financing and how their death negatively affects
their startups. We can identify founders who are only owners without working for the
firm (we refer to them as angel investors) and distinguish them from founders who are also
managers. This allows us to analyze better the hypothesis of founders as critical resources
which helps us to understand the productivity impact that their death might have on their
firm. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level throughout this analysis.
Our results provided by Tables 15 and 16 indicate that the effect is bigger when the pre-
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mature death of a founder who is also a manager occurs once we compare it with the
premature death of an angel investor. Suggesting that these manager founders contribute
something to their firms that angel investors do not. This is in line with the theoretical
literature that argues about the importance of human assets for the development of young
firms (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2001; Rajan, 2012).
Table 15: Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders
ln(Creditf,t ) ln(N umber Loansf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.736
-0.292∗∗∗
(0.079)
(0.037)
∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf × AngelInvf
0.308
0.237∗∗∗
(0.147)
(0.073)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES

Table 16: Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders in the
next period
ln(Creditf,t+1 ) ln(N umber Loansf,t+1 )
(1)
(2)
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-2.20∗∗∗
-0.212∗∗
(0.425)
(0.09)
P ostf,t × T reatedf × AngelInvf
1.70∗∗∗
0.069
(0.488)
(0.109)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

AngelInvf is equal to 1 if the deceased founder is an angel investor or
0 if the deceased founder is also a manager in the firm.
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In relation to the entry probability of new owner and employment, we observe that the
premature death of both manager founder and angel investors have a negative effect on
employment (see Table 17). However, the premature death of an angel investor has an
effect that is only 18.8% of the effect observed when the premature death of a manager
founder occurs. We also verify that once an angel investor dies there is an increase in the
entry probability of a new owner, while the death of a founder who is also a manager reduces
this probability.
Table 17: Human capital and startup financing - Differentiating Type of Founders
Entry N ew Ownerf,t ln(Employmentf,t )
(1)
(2)
∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
-0.020
-0.259∗∗∗
(0.008)
(0.062)
∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf × AngelInvf
0.028
0.211∗
(0.016)
(0.127)
N
13,110
8,667
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

AngelInvf is equal to 1 if the deceased founder is an angel investor or
0 if the deceased founder is also a manager in the firm.

When we focus on default (Table 18), we find a 7 percentage points reduction in the probability of default when a founder dies unexpectedly. We also observe that this decrease is
statistically significant, and this effect is higher when a founder who is also a manager in
the firm prematurely dies. These results are consistent with the reduction in the credit size
and loan. Since the premature death of a founder who is also a manager has a higher effect
on credit, these firms will have less access to credit, probably due to their higher probability
of default.

41

Table 18: Human capital and probability of default - Differentiating Type of Founders
P robability of Def aultf,t
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
P ostf,t × T reatedf
0.077
0.101∗∗∗
(0.012)
(0.015)
P ostf,t × T reatedf × AngelInvf
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.023)
N
13,110
13,110
Firm FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Firm Age FE
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

AngelInvf is equal to 1 if the deceased founder is an angel investor or
0 if the deceased founder is also a manager in the firm.

These results are consistent with the theoretical argument that establishes founders as critical resources for their firms (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2001; Rajan,
2012). It is also an important contribution to the empirical literature on entrepreneurial
finance, since we can estimate the relevance of different types of founders for startups. This
is something that has not been analyzed in the literature due to the lack of data.

5.3. Difference between startups and mature firms
To compare the importance of founders for startups and mature firms, we perform another
matching procedure defining the treated group as those firms that one of their founders
died prematurely. In this case we use the same characteristics considered in the previous
matching and we increase our sample by including any firm that suffers the shock (without
focusing on firms that one of their founders dies when they are startups). Through this new
matching procedure, we obtain a matched sample with 16,388 firms where half belongs to
the treated group and the other half belongs to the control group.
Figures 18, 19 and 20 show the effect of the shock on different variables related to credit
provided by banks and allow us to compare the effect between startups (which are those
firms that suffer the shock with at most five years of operation) and mature firms (which are
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those older than five years). Figure 18 reports the impact of the shock on a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm establishes a new relationship with a bank and 0 otherwise. Figure
19 presents the effect on a dummy variable equal 1 if at least one relationship between firm
and bank finishes and 0 otherwise. Figure 20 shows the effect of the shock on the volume
of credit.
There is a negative effect of the unexpected founder loss captured by the premature death
of founders on all measures related to credit applied in the analysis of this section. Thus,
we show that founders are also important for mature firms. This result is related to the
recent discussion on the CEO turnover literature on the importance of CEOs for publicly
traded firms (Bennedsen et al., 2020). However, as presented by Figure 18, we observe
that startups suffer a higher shock in comparison to mature firms once we focus on the
probability of establishing a new relation with a bank. Suggesting that our results related
to the importance of founders in startups might be related to their capacity to build new
credit relations with banks. Even though founders matter for both startups and mature
firms, our empirical strategy allows us to understand how this relevance can vary once we
compare these two different groups of firms.
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Figure 18: Premature death of founders and new relation comparing startups and mature
firms

Figure 19: Premature death of founders and exit comparing startups and mature firms
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Figure 20: Premature death of founders and credit comparing startups and mature firms

5.4. Financial constraints
Another possible explanation for our set of results would be related to financial constraints
getting tighter once the premature death of a founder occurs. This might be explained by
the fact that this founder could be the main investor of the firm and a manager. However,
the results on how differently this type of founder matters in comparison to an angel investor
provide evidence against that reasoning.
If we were capturing mainly a change in how startups become financially constrained after
the shock, we would not see a reduction in the entry probability of a new owner. Instead, we
would actually observe a similar result to what happens with the death of an angel investor.
Therefore, these findings suggest that indeed there is a productivity shock explained by the
loss of a founder-specific capital that goes beyond the provision of financing to the firm.
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION
This paper studies the importance of founders to startup financing. In particular, we focus
on how the human capital that founders bring to their firms matter for the capacity of
these firms to be financed. This is a question at the core of the recent discussion on the
entrepreneurial finance literature about the relevance of human assets to the growth of
early-stage firms.
We use a quasi-natural experiment based on the premature deaths of founders to analyze
how it affects the credit to which firms have access through bank lending. Our results show
that the premature death of a founder reduces credit size and number of loans. When
this shock happens, there is also a short-term increase in the probability of default and
in the interest rates. The results indicate that there is a reduction of credit and that
startup financing through bank lending becomes more expensive when these firms lose their
founders.
Our findings seem to be driven by the premature death of founders who are also managers
in their firms. The death of these founders tends to decrease the entry probability of a new
owner, while the death of an angel investors increases this probability. This suggests that
founders contribute critical resources to their firms that angel investors do not, and this
contribution improves the capacity of their firms to be financed.
Therefore, we provide evidence on how these young and early-stage firms are exposed to
risks related to the human capital provided by founders. These results have important
policy implications given the concern of policymakers with competition and innovation. Our
findings also help us to understand how inclusive financial markets are to small business
owners in Brazil.
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